Transcript [00:02] hello everyone welcome back to israel [00:03] matters [00:04] once again it's midweek uh starting next [00:07] week we will be back to doing this [00:09] on sunday but of course yesterday [00:12] we had yom kippur the day of atonement [00:15] the [00:16] most serious day i should say i don't [00:18] know what to call it's not a sad day [00:20] uh but there is it is kind of a happy [00:22] day wouldn't you think elliott [00:24] yeah so they have contemplation um [00:26] serious day [00:27] yeah yeah um [00:30] so i want to share a thought with you [00:32] most years on yom kippur [00:35] uh were you know we spent the entire day [00:38] in the synagogue and because of the [00:39] coronavirus this year [00:40] and limitations on gatherings there was [00:43] a lot more being done [00:44] on our own and there was a [00:48] there was a downside to it a lot of [00:50] people liked the fact that they didn't [00:52] have to spend all day in the synagogue [00:54] uh it's a difficult day i personally [00:57] love yom kippur people think i'm nuts [00:59] because you're fasting and you're [01:00] praying all day but i actually find it a [01:03] very inspiring experience and i really [01:04] do enjoy it [01:06] and i'm not just saying that like if you [01:07] ask my kids you know what's your dad's [01:09] favorite day of the year they would [01:11] probably roll their eyes and say you're [01:12] not going to believe this [01:14] yom kippur i actually really do i find [01:16] the entire [01:17] uh the entire build up to it and then [01:20] the entire build up within it [01:22] leads to this sense of the spiritual [01:26] space that we're in towards the end of [01:28] it the combination of the fasting and [01:30] the praying and the [01:32] and the disconnection from the physical [01:34] world that we have [01:36] that it really gets me into a kind of [01:39] different [01:40] mental space and very spiritually [01:44] tuned in and i didn't have that [01:48] experience quite the same way this year [01:49] it was a bit difficult but it got me [01:51] thinking about [01:52] some other things first just a word [01:54] about fasting i think there's a very [01:56] simple understanding of fasting and many [01:58] of our [01:59] our viewers who are not jewish do still [02:01] engage in fasting a lot of christians [02:03] take on fasts for various reasons for [02:05] repentance [02:06] and atonement and i just wanted to share [02:08] a very quick [02:10] simple idea just like last week i shared [02:12] a quick simple idea about the shofar [02:14] a quick simple idea about what we're [02:15] doing when we're fasting because we're [02:16] not just doing this to make ourselves [02:18] hungry or to [02:19] or to cause ourselves to suffer but it's [02:21] very simple [02:22] we're constantly battling within [02:24] ourselves between the primacy of our [02:27] body [02:27] and the primacy of our spirit and it's a [02:30] constant battle we have this every day [02:32] you know is my is my main identity my [02:34] body and my spirit is kind of there [02:38] uh to support my body or to give it some [02:41] meaning [02:43] or is my main identity my spirit and my [02:46] body is kind of this [02:48] car i'm driving or this thing that this [02:50] this garment that my spirit is that my [02:53] soul is wearing [02:54] and it's a constant battle which one do [02:56] we identify with more and a very simple [02:58] thing we're doing when we're fasting [03:00] is we're essentially saying to the [03:01] bodily needs to the body [03:05] you're not in charge today we're not [03:08] going to pay attention to you [03:10] today i'm going to identify holy [03:13] entirely with [03:14] my spirit with my soul and that's why [03:18] our restrictions are not just not eating [03:20] we don't bathe [03:21] we don't engage in sexual relations you [03:23] know there's in other words [03:24] the needs of the body are not being paid [03:27] attention to now that's not an ideal [03:28] state god does not want us to [03:31] slit our wrists and disconnect from the [03:32] physical world [03:34] but it it has a an instructive [03:38] and kind of i should say therapeutic [03:42] spiritually therapeutic effect in [03:45] reminding the body that the priority is [03:47] the soul [03:48] so basically the soul decides when we're [03:50] going to eat the soul decides [03:52] uh not the body the body's not in [03:54] control and [03:56] that itself is supposed to we're [03:57] supposed to take that with us into [04:00] all of the enjoyment of sukkot the feast [04:02] of tabernacles that follows which in [04:04] historical times when it was more [04:06] agrarian society in this part of the [04:08] world [04:09] this was the time of greatest material [04:11] plenty [04:12] it's the end of the harvest season [04:14] people were at their wealthiest [04:16] and they're essentially being reminded [04:18] that the spirit comes [04:19] first so that's basically what fasting [04:21] is all about [04:22] i just want to share that something to [04:24] think about when we're fasting we're not [04:25] just trying to [04:26] torture ourselves um but the [04:30] the thought that i had for you and we [04:32] even chatted a little bit [04:34] last night right after yom kippur ended [04:35] was i was sitting back and i was [04:37] thinking about [04:38] yom kippur and the fact that you know [04:41] you go back 47 years and a war [04:44] broke out on yom kippur attacked us [04:47] as you know any of you have ever been in [04:50] israel for yom kippur [04:51] this country is silent on yom kippur [04:53] even [04:54] jews who are not generally observant of [04:56] jewish law respect yom kippur enough [04:58] that there's really no cars in the [05:00] streets [05:01] there's no activity it is dead silence [05:04] i live in a city not like you know [05:06] elliot lives in a more rural place but i [05:08] live in a city [05:09] i live in a busy street corner and it is [05:11] just silent [05:12] san antonio keyboard and i was thinking [05:14] about what it must have been like 47 [05:16] years ago [05:17] when a war breaks out and our enemies [05:19] attacked us at that time and [05:21] our enemies were formidable there was a [05:22] legitimate fear that the state of israel [05:25] was in existential peril at the time [05:29] and i was thinking about all of this and [05:31] i was kind of being grateful [05:33] feeling kind of happy about it saying [05:35] wow look how far we've come [05:38] syria is a non-entity egypt is a [05:40] non-entity [05:41] jordan is at peace with us and [05:44] you know so we have lebanon which is a i [05:47] mean it's more than a mosquito in our [05:48] ear it's a serious problem [05:51] hamas is more of a mosquito in our ear [05:53] bothering us that we have to control [05:56] but i was contemplating the fact that [05:57] look how far we've come and i don't have [05:59] to live in fear of an existential threat [06:03] on yom kippur and then i started [06:05] thinking well wait a second am i fooling [06:07] myself [06:08] is that accurate i gotta talk to elliot [06:11] so i'm throwing that out to you [06:13] and then i ruined your evening well you [06:15] know [06:16] you know let's hear you share with [06:18] everyone how you responded you gave me [06:20] some reading material [06:21] but i want to know like am i totally off [06:24] base with that way of thinking [06:26] i don't i don't think it's it's a [06:27] question of being totally off base we [06:29] are [06:30] we're certainly in a different place [06:31] today than we were then [06:34] however and i think here here's the [06:35] however [06:37] there are two phrases [06:42] that when i hear them i worry [06:45] one is they wouldn't dare [06:49] and the other is they can't [06:53] both of those are extremely dangerous [06:56] concepts [06:58] and i can tell you having studied [07:00] strategic surprise among other things [07:03] over the course of my career they [07:05] wouldn't dare and they can't [07:07] always precede a surprise attack [07:11] whether it's pearl harbor uh the german [07:14] invasion of russia [07:15] yom kippur others uh [07:18] basically belittling the enemy either by [07:22] belittling their capability or [07:23] belittling their intentions or both [07:26] and israel went even further than that [07:28] they [07:29] in 1973 creating an entire theoretical [07:33] framework that came to be known as the [07:35] concept [07:36] or the conceptia explaining how they [07:39] simply weren't going to attack us [07:41] now this was this had to go on was this [07:43] because of our success in the six day [07:45] war [07:46] yes you just you you beat my sentence by [07:48] one you're not a go [07:49] very good uh yes in part [07:52] in part the success of the six day war [07:55] created [07:56] what i call two deadly myths one is that [07:59] the arabs are incompetent [08:01] and that their incompetence is permanent [08:03] in other words it's inherent [08:05] and two is that we're superman our [08:06] pilots don't even need planes they just [08:08] go up there and fly and take everything [08:10] out [08:10] uh you know our guys are absolutely [08:13] capable of everything [08:14] now even that was a myth because aside [08:17] from the fact that [08:19] the ideas are myth nobody considered [08:22] that [08:22] over 700 israeli soldiers were killed in [08:24] the six day war [08:27] 700 in the six day war which was touted [08:30] as this great walk over against a bunch [08:32] of [08:33] buffoons and nobody really stopped to [08:36] analyze how did the buffoons kill 700 [08:39] israeli soldiers [08:40] in six days and [08:43] i mean these are these tough questions [08:46] now when the young people [08:50] that's not a high death toll for a war [08:52] but it is for a war that's only six days [08:54] long that's my point [08:56] look i'll i'll give you a an interesting [08:58] um [09:00] analytical point that i know is correct [09:02] because it's mine [09:04] and it was published in [09:08] in context of a paper so somebody other [09:11] people [09:12] apparently agreed with it um [09:15] one of the measures of intensity of [09:17] combat other things being equal [09:19] is number of killed per period of time [09:23] in this case per day [09:25] okay so over 100 israelis were israeli [09:27] soldiers were killed on the average [09:29] per day of the six day war now if you [09:33] ask the average israeli to this day [09:36] which war was a more intense war [09:38] intensive [09:39] the six-day war of the yom kippur war [09:42] ninety-nine point nine percent of [09:43] israelis will say the yum kippur war [09:46] however the yom kippur war lasted 21 22 [09:50] days depending on how you count [09:52] which sees fire and 2 400 [09:55] and again 2300 2500 depending on how you [09:58] count casualties [09:59] soldiers were killed so you do the [10:02] arithmetic [10:04] 2300 over 21 700 over six [10:08] and you'll see the statistically [10:09] insignificant [10:12] in other words the six day war for all [10:16] sorts of psychological reasons that [10:17] contextual reasons was looked upon [10:19] as this enormous no-fault victory [10:23] which it wasn't [10:26] and with that israel goes [10:29] into yom kippur 1973 basically [10:33] saying they won't attack us [10:36] they can't attack us and if they do [10:39] we'll be done with them in less than six [10:40] days just like we did the last time [10:43] except many many things have changed [10:45] along the way [10:47] and israel is caught by surprise [10:52] now the article that i sent you last [10:54] night [10:55] written by reserve general gershon [10:58] cohen appeared in a couple of places [11:02] people can look it up but essentially he [11:05] he points out and and gershon is is a [11:08] brilliant analyst [11:10] um he points out two very important [11:12] things i think [11:14] the first is that it was very easy to [11:16] blame the intelligence failure for the [11:18] disaster of yom kippur [11:20] because an intelligence failure is is a [11:22] fluke and even [11:24] knowing some of the inside of it it was [11:26] more than a fluke it would [11:27] the chief of intelligence lied to the [11:29] chief of staff in other words [11:31] there was some some dirty stuff in there [11:32] as well [11:34] but ultimately was an intelligence [11:35] failure and intelligence failures [11:37] happened and it happened and there we [11:38] were [11:40] but that and that's convenient because [11:42] what that basically [11:43] allows for is the if we had only known [11:46] it would have been different [11:47] meaning our system is okay our system is [11:50] fine [11:51] right we were caught by surprises by [11:53] surprise and and that happens and [11:55] and don't worry it's not going to happen [11:56] again well right [11:58] and even if it does we're we're we're [12:00] set [12:02] now again if you if your belief is [12:05] all you need is good intelligence that [12:08] leaves all sorts of holes another place [12:10] i'll come back to that in a moment [12:12] but coming back to the umkeeper war uh [12:15] if you could blame it all on the [12:16] intelligence failure and that's what was [12:18] done essentially [12:20] then you can basically say hey look we [12:23] were fine we were good [12:24] we were caught by surprise they sucker [12:26] punched us it was our fault [12:29] um but you know they they had a good [12:30] strategy and they they played it well [12:32] and as soon as we realized what was [12:35] happening [12:36] we got going and and we beat them except [12:38] that's not the case [12:39] and here let me start by saying that the [12:42] guys [12:43] on the ground as usual fought amazingly [12:47] well [12:48] in other words the troops in the field [12:49] and i'm going up to even [12:51] battalion and brigade command in other [12:53] words the the lieutenant colonels and [12:54] colonels who were in the field [12:57] with a few exceptions there were always [12:58] exceptions but as a as a [13:00] class fought like lions they did [13:03] incredible things they fought impossible [13:06] odds they held out they stood in places [13:09] where [13:09] no army in the world would have stood [13:12] but and here's the but [13:16] the reserve call-up was a disaster [13:21] and [13:24] that's not explained by surprise because [13:28] a reserve call-up should be prepared for [13:30] a surprise [13:34] the logistical system was a disaster [13:36] that can't be explained by surprise [13:39] logistical system should be ready for [13:41] everything at any time [13:44] orders weren't followed there were plans [13:46] in place the air force [13:50] didn't do it with what it was supposed [13:51] to do again the pilots [13:53] the pilots were amazing the [13:57] command level didn't execute [14:03] the doctrine was [14:07] poor especially in cyanide gershwin akon [14:11] makes a point of this [14:12] ariel sharon the war broke out on [14:14] shabbat yom kippur october 6th [14:17] on monday ariel sharon who [14:20] incidentally in my opinion you can say [14:22] whatever you want about his politics [14:24] or his personality a world-class [14:27] military genius historical military [14:30] genius [14:32] gets his reserve division in the field [14:35] within two days [14:37] which was astounding but in part because [14:40] he was [14:40] his division was ready to go to war [14:43] except [14:45] they weren't ready to fight the war that [14:47] the egyptians were bringing to them [14:48] no is it his fault partially but it's [14:51] partially the fault of an overall [14:52] doctrine [14:53] that didn't change its position [14:56] from 1967 to 73 and he launches this [15:00] attack on monday and gets massacred [15:05] the uh the the egyptian forces [15:08] are heavily equipped with anti-tank [15:10] missiles this was known [15:12] it was not accounted for in doctrine and [15:15] he loses a huge number of tanks in this [15:17] counter-attack [15:18] and we're trying to fight the six-day [15:21] war again [15:22] yes but from the wrong place [15:26] okay the reason the six day wall is [15:28] fought the way it was fought one of the [15:29] reasons [15:30] is that israel had no room to maneuver [15:33] the israel of 1967 is tiny [15:37] the israel of 1973 tactically is [15:40] large especially in the south because of [15:43] sinai [15:44] [Music] [15:45] okay though the battles [15:49] give under the circumstances should not [15:51] have been fought along the suez canal [15:54] israel had 135 miles of desert to drop [15:58] back into [16:00] absorb the egyptian attack [16:04] mass its forces and beat the heck out of [16:07] them [16:08] which it by the way ultimately did two [16:10] weeks later [16:12] but taking losses here also to be fair [16:16] the army had a very very sharp learning [16:18] curve the army the air force [16:19] had a very sharp learning curve didn't [16:22] make the same mistakes [16:24] two weeks later but the first mistakes [16:27] were avoidable [16:30] now some things in war are not avoidable [16:32] but the first mistakes were avoidable [16:35] well what changed on the egyptian side [16:37] why it was what did we miss [16:39] okay so first of all uh the russians [16:41] helped them tremendously [16:44] second they accepted their weaknesses [16:48] and i'll give you just one example [16:52] but they accepted their weaknesses and [16:53] they played into their own [16:56] whatever strengths they had without [16:58] trying to [17:00] push their weaknesses so it's [17:03] kind of an interesting back and forth [17:05] one of the lessons of the six day war [17:07] was that if you have air superiority [17:10] you have battlefield superiority that [17:13] we knocked out their air forces on the [17:15] first couple of days [17:16] and the israeli air force controlled the [17:18] skies [17:20] and we then developed a principle part [17:23] of the concept that said [17:24] the arabs will not attack without air [17:27] superiority as long as we have air [17:28] superiority [17:29] they will not attack us the egyptians [17:32] and syrians [17:33] split the difference they said we don't [17:36] need air superiority [17:38] all we need to do is deny the israelis [17:41] air superiority over the battlefield [17:44] and they did that with missiles and [17:47] anti-aircraft guns [17:49] rather than with their air force so what [17:51] they basically said is you can have [17:53] superiority everywhere in the middle [17:54] east except over the battlefield [17:59] and we knew that they [18:02] had moved missiles into the into the [18:04] theater we knew that already in 69 [18:05] 70. we knew they were getting russian [18:07] equipment [18:09] um but we didn't put two and two [18:12] together and we didn't [18:14] think forward saying okay what [18:17] what is the minimum they need not the [18:20] maximum [18:21] and they operated on the minimum our air [18:24] force every time it engaged their planes [18:26] blew them out of the sky [18:29] but it couldn't engage on the ground and [18:32] that's where it was needed [18:33] so i can give you other examples but it [18:36] was a change it was a change in concept [18:38] and by the way using the missiles and [18:40] guns required [18:42] much lower skill training than bringing [18:45] their pilots up to a level to be able to [18:46] engage israeli pilots [18:49] okay so to give you a modern analogy [18:53] hezbollah's rockets or even hamas [18:55] rockets are dumb they're not trying to [18:57] beat us at our technological level [18:59] they're trying to beat us below our [19:01] technical technological level [19:03] they can't match technology for [19:06] technology [19:06] let's say the iron dome so they use [19:09] kites and balloons [19:12] all right that's a way that's that or in [19:14] hezbollah's case [19:15] in terms of their battle plan they'll [19:17] use volume or volume [19:19] correct um [19:22] in other words they've built their [19:25] system around their capabilities [19:27] in a way that avoids [19:30] the teeth if you will of our capability [19:39] the complacency is back now let me let [19:42] me [19:43] go back one step and by the way i need [19:45] to to say this [19:46] um people who know me know me well [19:48] enough to know [19:49] i am not an idf basher uh [19:52] this is not about the idf is a terrible [19:54] army and it doesn't know what it's doing [19:56] and that sort of thing i'm an officer in [19:58] the idf i'm still in the reserves [20:00] uh proud of it it's not about that [20:04] but being [20:07] accurate in assessment is also very [20:09] important [20:10] one of the call its [20:14] perennial chronic historical weaknesses [20:17] of the idf [20:20] is the youth of its officer court [20:25] now this started from necessity in 1948 [20:31] and let's keep remember that the israeli [20:33] army that won in 1948 [20:35] was a thoroughly totally unprofessional [20:38] army [20:39] it was a militia and it was a [20:41] conglomerate of a number of militias [20:43] and it was made up of whoever [20:47] can they could get in they they had [20:49] holocaust survivors getting off the boat [20:50] and they were putting on trucks [20:51] and throwing them into the battlefield [20:54] there were a few [20:55] officers who came from [20:59] allied armies of world war ii most of [21:02] them jewish not all of them [21:03] mickey marcus being one of the more [21:05] famous ones but certainly not the only [21:07] one [21:08] uh from the us army he had been a [21:09] colonel and was killed here [21:12] during the war during 1948 [21:15] but the average officer [21:18] and i'm talking about all the way up [21:20] through colonel and even general [21:22] had no real military experience maybe [21:24] they served as soldiers [21:26] and here i can tell you somebody who [21:28] serves as a private or corporal or even [21:30] a sergeant has absolutely no idea what's [21:32] happening at the colonel in general [21:33] level [21:35] two different worlds [21:39] when moshe dayan was chief of staff in [21:42] the in [21:42] the 1950s in the mid-1950s he [21:45] instituted a policy [21:49] based on his experience in 1948 [21:54] that officers should move up quickly and [21:56] retire young [21:57] being an officer in the army is not a [21:59] career it's a first step to your real [22:02] career which starts afterwards [22:05] and it's still true today exactly [22:08] ben gurion opposed it but was not [22:12] willing to overrule dayan now back in [22:15] the day [22:17] people generals were retiring from the [22:19] israeli army at age 4243 [22:25] they were putting in 25 years from age [22:27] 18 and retiring [22:30] now i'm sorry you know what [22:33] yoni netanyahu was a lieutenant colonel [22:36] at 27. [22:40] [Music] [22:43] you shouldn't be a lieutenant colonel [22:44] when you're 27. [22:48] our the the result of it is [22:52] a deep professional military [22:54] professionalization [22:56] of the officer corps wow so this is [22:58] still the case today [22:59] yes it is it's not as bad are there any [23:02] voices are there any voices [23:04] on the inside at the leadership level [23:06] that recognize this as a problem [23:08] no not on the inside on the outside [23:11] there are [23:12] but not on the inside okay some of [23:15] some of it has to do with the conscript [23:17] system but when an american [23:20] officer goes into the military [23:23] he or she is either a graduate of an [23:25] academy like west point [23:26] or rotc in other words they've got a [23:29] college degree [23:30] and they're 22 years old an israeli goes [23:37] to officer school [23:38] when he's 19 he or she is 19 maybe 20. [23:44] those two years are huge [23:48] because the person who's graduated not [23:52] only they've not only graduated college [23:53] and we all have our we know colleges and [23:55] dollars cracked up to me [23:57] but they've also taken whether it's in [23:59] the academy or rotc [24:01] they have taken college-level military [24:03] courses [24:07] they have a much deeper sense of what [24:09] they're doing and and it continues as [24:11] they [24:12] rise up into the system we have [24:15] 22 23 year old captains who haven't gone [24:19] to college [24:20] we've had chiefs of staff who never went [24:22] to college it's not the case anymore but [24:25] it was the case [24:28] when you're running a system this big [24:31] you need [24:31] more than talent and here i'll tell you [24:34] one thing that the israeli military does [24:36] amazingly well [24:37] is personnel selection in other words [24:40] the men and women who are doing the jobs [24:42] are outstanding individuals they're very [24:45] good at identifying talent and getting [24:47] it into the right place [24:48] right and as you well know talent will [24:50] cover a multitude of sins [24:51] but only up to a point well so this [24:54] means that [24:55] that very high ranking officers in the [24:57] israeli army [24:58] don't have that scope of seeing [25:03] multiple generations of [25:06] transition in in our enemies [25:10] and you know one of the things that i [25:12] got out of the article you sent me [25:14] obviously we're you know we're kind of [25:15] talking about something that our viewers [25:17] haven't read you know i'll put a link in [25:19] the description of this video [25:20] to that article by gershwin put up put [25:23] up i'll send you the basil link it's a [25:24] shorter version [25:25] okay good uh is that one of the things [25:28] that we have to pay attention to and i [25:30] think this is part of the complacency [25:31] that i was feeling [25:32] yesterday on yom kippur is that [25:35] the motivations of our enemies [25:40] can shift and change as well meaning [25:42] like what [25:44] like like right now in lebanon there's a [25:46] major crisis going on and we haven't [25:48] spoken about it yet i think we should in [25:49] one of our upcoming episodes about [25:51] what's going on with france and [25:52] and with like and the the economic [25:54] crisis in lebanon and [25:56] they're actually separate from the fact [25:58] that they're trying to destroy israel [25:59] and that hezbollah is an arm of iran [26:02] there's also the fact that lebanon [26:03] itself is imploding yes [26:05] and and i was thinking about the fact [26:07] like wow that's great you know our [26:08] enemies are you know just like you know [26:10] the fact that syria has disintegrated it [26:12] it's terrible human tragedy but from [26:15] israel's security perspective what was a [26:18] beast of an enemy on our northern border [26:20] is a non-entity anymore with syria [26:22] and i was thinking kind of the same [26:23] thing with lebanon wow they have so many [26:25] internal problems going on and [26:27] and the whole regime is so rickety [26:30] that maybe this is a good thing because [26:32] they're kind of weak and then i thought [26:33] to myself wait a second [26:36] all that means is that their mindset [26:38] about timing to attack us could change [26:41] that they could have you know greater [26:43] desperation on behalf of hezbollah could [26:45] actually [26:46] mean that the that the fuse to [26:49] to ignite a war is shorter and that [26:53] could mean that it's a more dangerous [26:54] more volatile situation [26:57] right one of the issues is how they view [27:00] it and that's something we can never [27:01] really know from the outside [27:03] in other words do they say let's be [27:05] patient things will get better [27:07] or do they say this is the closing [27:09] window use it or lose it if we don't do [27:11] it now we're never gonna we won't get [27:12] another chance [27:14] and there's no way of knowing [27:18] from the outside what will actually [27:21] drive their decision-making [27:23] their overall objective is fixed [27:26] destroying israel [27:27] is is is graven in stone [27:30] so the question is when and how and [27:33] those are things [27:34] that are very very difficult to predict [27:38] um let me let me [27:41] leave you with a um sort of a positive [27:44] note [27:44] even even it well even even if it's [27:47] elliott ending on something positive is [27:49] very important okay [27:51] so even if it's a positive note that [27:54] that stage is a negative [27:56] okay with all of their planning [28:01] in 1973 and this works in reverse too [28:05] with all of our planning [28:06] potentially with all of their planning [28:09] the attack on yom kippur cost them the [28:13] war [28:15] and we look at it and again i you know [28:18] i read all this stuff especially i don't [28:20] understand so i read the emotional stuff [28:22] you're saying that had the [28:24] syrians and egyptians attacked on a [28:26] different not attacked on yom kippur [28:28] they this contributed to their loss [28:34] so first of all you know we have the [28:36] emotional approach it was the holiest [28:38] day of the year everybody was fasting [28:40] and [28:40] yeah that's true but let's look at two [28:42] things and i'll i'll [28:44] give you one that was tactical and brief [28:46] but very important [28:47] on the golan fighting and one that was [28:50] sort of grander and they should have [28:51] known better in both cases but they [28:53] certainly should have known the second [28:54] one much better [28:58] the arab armies had modern russian tanks [29:01] that had night vision equipment [29:04] israel did not have night vision [29:05] equipment give you gives you another [29:06] idea [29:08] it was out there it existed but our [29:11] tanks did not have night vision [29:13] what they had was infrared in those days [29:14] state of the art today of course [29:16] obsolete [29:18] when the sun set the war broke out at [29:20] two o'clock in the afternoon [29:22] when the sun set that evening [29:26] at about six o'clock or so seven o'clock [29:30] and when when dark they had a tremendous [29:34] advantage [29:34] except for one thing the moon was up [29:40] now without going into the details maybe [29:43] in another lecture i'll [29:44] give you the details of how the moon [29:46] works let it be sufficient to say [29:48] that the night battles were fought on [29:50] the golan on the nights of the 11th 12th [29:53] 13th and 14th of time full moon full [29:55] moon approaching a full moon [29:57] and the moon was in the sky when the sun [29:59] set yeah last night i looked at the moon [30:01] it was only april [30:02] okay right it's about three quarter moon [30:04] right full moon is on the 15th [30:06] right so from the 10th to 15th from the [30:09] 11th [30:10] the 11th right right we'll say yom [30:12] kippur the night after [30:13] that's right so the 11th and on so it's [30:16] about a three-quarters moon i'll tell [30:17] you something else [30:18] that you don't know nobody knows but i [30:20] wrote this in the manual so i know [30:23] the percentage of the moon that's out at [30:25] night is the percentage of that night [30:26] that the moon is out [30:29] ah so a three-quarters moon is out three [30:33] quarters of the night a full moon is out [30:34] all night [30:36] you know that on rosh the moon is just [30:38] over the horizon [30:40] setting with the sun it's barely there [30:42] right on the first of the month [30:44] okay so not only did they have a bright [30:47] moon [30:47] they had a almost a full night's worth [30:50] of moon [30:50] and the night the part of the night that [30:52] was dark was the least important part [30:55] four five in the morning so they should [30:56] have attacked us on rosh hashanah [30:58] you got it exactly had they attacked on [31:01] rosh hashanah [31:02] or the on air of rosh hashanah right the [31:04] day before hashanah [31:05] they would have had moonless nights and [31:07] a tremendous advantage with their night [31:09] vision wow that's fascinating [31:11] okay and i think who commanded the 77th [31:14] battalion [31:15] used the moonlight i won't go into how [31:18] that's a whole interesting story but he [31:19] used the moonlight to his advantage [31:21] wow that's amazing okay so that's one [31:24] minor error [31:26] major error minor it cost them to go [31:28] down but never mind it was a minor error [31:30] the major error is [31:34] when the war broke out at two o'clock in [31:35] the afternoon where was everybody [31:37] in israel in synagogue [31:42] pesach if you're still in synagogue at [31:44] two o'clock in the afternoon on yom [31:45] kippur [31:47] shoot the hazan shoot the counter and [31:49] get a new one [31:50] well now two o'clock is usually when [31:52] we're [31:53] finished we spend the whole day in the [31:56] synagogue but usually there's a break of [31:57] a couple of hours [31:58] right and it's probably around you know [32:01] from you know [32:02] four o'clock right exactly by two [32:04] o'clock you know what the war broke out [32:05] of two [32:06] two thirty the system sort of woke up [32:08] everywhere everyone's dirty in their [32:10] break they're leaving everybody's hug [32:12] everybody for their for their one hour [32:14] put you you know put your feet right on [32:16] the couch [32:16] before going back to the synagogue and [32:18] those who don't go to synagogue have [32:20] been home all day because there's no [32:21] place to go [32:22] right now remember in 1973 this is a [32:24] country with no cell phones [32:26] no computers no internet most people [32:30] don't have telephones [32:31] it was very easy to round everyone up [32:33] they knew where everybody was [32:35] wow and and all the traffic and this is [32:38] what the reserve call up disaster [32:41] all of the traffic is going from the [32:43] population centers [32:45] out to the reserve mobilization and they [32:48] don't have to deal with any [32:49] with any civilian traffic because the [32:51] roads are empty [32:53] that's that's right all the traffic in [32:54] the country [32:56] now let me ask you a question you're not [32:59] a military expert but you know a little [33:00] bit about [33:01] israel what would have happened had they [33:04] attacked [33:05] in the intermediate days of sukkot [33:10] chaos chaos where would where would the [33:12] average israeli be [33:14] anywhere all over the place okay but [33:16] primarily [33:17] just for everyone the intermediate days [33:19] of sukkot are days of travel [33:21] everyone is visiting family and visiting [33:24] national parks and taking their family [33:26] on on a cup on a day of vacation [33:28] somewhere [33:29] no one is where they normally are and [33:32] it's the worst traffic of the year [33:33] right now again go back to 1973 [33:37] the number of cars in the country is [33:38] much less people are traveling by [33:40] public transportation and they're going [33:43] primarily where to the sea of galilee [33:47] and to sinai to the beaches that's right [33:51] now let me ask you a question a war [33:53] breaks out [33:54] an average joe israeli is at the beach [33:58] in either place with the wife and a [34:00] couple of kids [34:01] does he go straight to the army or bring [34:03] him home first [34:06] fascinating you're right it's it's uh [34:11] so they thought they were getting us on [34:13] yom kippur it actually it actually [34:14] worked it [34:15] probably cost them two days of reserve [34:18] mess [34:19] maybe three wow these two insights here [34:22] about the moon and that are just [34:24] those are those are really interesting [34:26] those i i've been [34:27] you know i've read a lot of stuff on the [34:29] yom kippur war and i never [34:31] never it's not on the left about those [34:33] that's fascinating [34:34] all right elliot that's all i got for [34:36] today this was awesome we'll see [34:38] everyone next week [34:39] it'll be in the middle of sukkot the [34:41] feast of tabernacles uh which is a very [34:44] generally a very joyous time a time of [34:45] celebration [34:47] and we will share some thoughts on that [34:50] as well [34:51] and let's see what the news brings us [34:52] you never know in 2020 [34:54] absolutely god bless you all and keep [34:56] praying for israel
In this episode, Rabbi Pesach Wolicki reflects on how far Israel has come since the surprise attack that began the Yom Kippur War 47 years ago. Surely, our enemies could never launch such a dangerous surprise attack again. Elliot Chodoff, with his expertise in military strategy and history, sets us straight once again. He takes us on a journey to understand what really happened on Yom Kippur 1973 and explains that some of the weaknesses that led us into that trap may still be part of Israel's military and defense systems.
