Transcript [00:00] What is going on with Project Freedom [00:02] and Project Freedom, if you've been [00:04] paying attention, was announced by the [00:06] United States a few days ago and that is [00:07] the operation to escort merchant ships [00:10] through the Straits of Hormuz, through [00:12] the Gulf, because of Iranian disruptions [00:14] to global shipping. They announced they [00:16] were doing it, then they announced that [00:18] it was that it was going to be paused, [00:20] temporarily paused, or canceled, or [00:22] whatever. And then we have reporting [00:24] from today in the Wall Street Journal [00:26] that it's back on. We're going to unpack [00:28] what took place here and and what I [00:31] think it all means, where the pressure [00:33] was coming from, and we're going to get [00:34] into all of it in this video. So, let's [00:36] get right to it. So, we saw this [00:38] headline, "Saudi Pressure Forced US [00:42] to halt [00:43] Hormuz escort mission, report. During [00:46] the US's Operation Epic Fury against [00:48] Iran before ongoing temporary US Iran [00:50] ceasefire, Saudi Arabia allowed the US [00:53] to fly aircraft from the Prince Sultan [00:55] airbase." And what does it say here? "US [00:58] President Donald Trump's decision to [00:59] pause a US operation to guide ships [01:02] through the Strait of Hormuz came as a [01:04] result of pressure from Saudi Arabia, [01:07] according to NBC News report citing two [01:09] US officials. According to the [01:11] officials, the US allies among the Gulf [01:13] states were surprised by Trump's Sunday [01:15] announcement of Project Freedom, which [01:17] was launched on Monday. Saudi Arabian [01:20] leadership of informed the US that it [01:21] would not allow US military aircraft to [01:25] fly from Saudi Prince Sultan airbase or [01:28] through Saudi airspace to carry out the [01:31] effort to escort stranded vessels out of [01:32] the strait." Okay, why would Saudi [01:35] Arabia not allow the US to use its its [01:38] ground or airspace to open up the [01:39] Straits of Hormuz? That sounds like [01:41] something they would be on board with. [01:42] So, what exactly is going on here? [01:45] So, um let's uh let's take a look at [01:47] this piece here from The Indian Express. [01:49] "Trump pauses Project Freedom. What this [01:51] means for US GCC Alliance, Strait of [01:54] Hormuz." [01:56] On May 4th, US President Donald Trump [01:58] announced a plan dubbed Project Freedom [02:00] to escort ships stuck in the Strait of [02:01] Hormuz. It ended two days later with [02:04] just two of the thousands of stranded [02:06] ships guided through. [02:08] And while while Trump cited requests [02:12] from Pakistan and other countries as [02:14] well as progress in ceasefire [02:16] negotiations, an NBC report said the [02:18] reversal was triggered by backlash from [02:21] Gulf allies such as Saudi Arabia who [02:24] were caught unaware about the plan. [02:28] These dizzying shifts come as the US and [02:30] Iran negotiate a lasting end to the war [02:32] amid a fragile ceasefire in West Asia. [02:36] One of the sticking points is the Strait [02:37] of Hormuz blockade. Okay. [02:40] So, why did Trump pause it? According to [02:42] the Embassy report, he got uh pressured [02:44] by Saudi Arabia. We've already said [02:45] that. [02:47] And then it says here that without that [02:50] Kuwait too reportedly denied Washington [02:52] access to its bases and airspace for the [02:54] proposed mission. Without Saudi and [02:56] Kuwaiti airspace, US aircraft were [02:58] unable to protect ships. [03:00] The report said that other close Gulf [03:02] allies were also caught off guard. The [03:05] US reportedly spoke to Qatar and Oman [03:08] only after Trump had made the [03:10] announcements. [03:11] The regional partners reportedly opposed [03:13] the plan over fears that it could [03:15] escalate tensions amid shaky peace talks [03:19] and a fragile ceasefire. [03:22] Trump's abrupt announcement and pause [03:23] reflect a pattern that has been [03:26] since that has been seen since the [03:28] beginning of the war. [03:29] He frequently has not consulted He has [03:31] frequently not consulted his Gulf allies [03:34] before making decisions or has acted [03:35] contrary to their advice. But why [03:37] wouldn't they want this [03:38] this to go forward? Even if they weren't [03:39] aware of it, you'd think that they would [03:41] want the Straits of Hormuz to be opened [03:43] and the US protecting the Straits of [03:45] Hormuz and uh you know, and using their [03:47] their space as cover would be a good [03:49] idea. [03:51] But the crucial difference here the [03:53] article goes on the crucial difference [03:54] here is that project freedom was an [03:56] announced after the UAE quit OPEC with [03:59] the the organization of petroleum [04:01] exporting countries splitting the Gulf [04:03] in the middle. [04:06] And this was pointed out by Bashir Ali [04:07] Abbas, senior research associate at the [04:09] Council for Strategic and Defense [04:11] Research. So, what does it what is [04:12] leaving what is UAE leaving OPEC have to [04:14] do with being opposed to this? [04:16] Significantly, the UAE appeared aligned [04:19] with the plan and seemingly in response [04:21] Iran attacked the UAE's major oil [04:24] industry in Fujairah. [04:27] So, when in other words, what they're [04:29] implying here is that when the other [04:30] Gulf states saw that the UAE who was [04:32] supportive of the plan got attacked, [04:35] they worried that this would escalate [04:36] attacks against them. Are they so afraid [04:38] of any Iranian attacks [04:41] on them after everything that's gone on [04:43] with the US in there to to ostensibly [04:45] protect them? Are they so worried that [04:47] they don't want to be part of opening up [04:49] the Straits of Hormuz? [04:50] What is really behind all of this? [04:55] The article goes on and says that Iran's [04:57] response to the US-Israeli war has [04:59] affected Gulf countries to varying [05:01] degrees. The worst hit has been the UAE. [05:05] The war initially brought together [05:08] the two rival power players in the [05:10] region, the Saudis and the UAE, [05:13] just weeks after tension over Yemen [05:15] reached a boiling point. UAE and Saudi [05:17] Arabia have tensions in Yemen. They back [05:19] rival factions, [05:21] both of whom oppose the Houthis, [05:24] uh but they have tensions down there. [05:25] I've made I've made videos about that. [05:27] We're not going to get into that here, [05:28] but basically the UAE and Saudi Arabia [05:30] we tend to think of them as allies as [05:31] closely associated, but they're not. And [05:34] that had to do with the OPEC exit. UAE's [05:36] exit from OPEC has once and for all [05:38] ended any perception of the GCC as a [05:41] monolith, meaning as united, especially [05:43] in terms of their relationship with the [05:45] US. [05:47] Okay, let me get into this much more [05:49] deeply. What exactly happened here? So, [05:51] there's a fantastic article in The Week. [05:53] The Week is an Indian publication. [05:56] Very reliable, very high-level analysis [05:59] of geopolitics. [06:01] So, Gulf states question US reliability [06:03] after Iran attacks, seek new security [06:06] guarantees. This is what is really [06:08] happening. If you're wondering [06:10] and this is what this video is about. If [06:12] you're wondering, why are these Gulf [06:13] states Why did they slam on the brakes [06:16] on Project Freedom? Even if they didn't [06:17] know about it, the maybe the [06:18] announcement and the rollout was a [06:20] little bit sloppy, but you would you [06:22] would still think that it's a good [06:23] thing, right? Have the Americans come [06:25] in, protect uh traffic through through [06:28] the Strait of Hormuz. [06:30] Right? They're all being attacked by [06:31] Iran earlier in the war. You'd think [06:33] that they'd all be in favor. Why did [06:35] they do it? [06:36] So, look at this piece. Fascinating [06:38] piece. We're going to go through this [06:39] and I will I will stop at various points [06:41] and explain. [06:43] Okay, the GCC is the is the partnership [06:46] of the Gulf states, okay? So, the US-GCC [06:48] security partnership is facing its [06:51] deepest crisis, its deepest crisis of [06:54] confidence in decades. [06:57] Really? Isn't that interesting? The US [06:59] is fighting Iran, ostensibly on the side [07:01] of the Gulf states, but that's not how [07:03] they see it. Across the Gulf, [07:06] a growing belief has taken hold that [07:07] Washington is no longer a dependable [07:10] guarantor of security and stability. [07:13] That rupture widened dramatically after [07:16] Iran launched waves of ballistic and [07:18] cruise missile attacks on Emirati [07:21] targets, [07:22] including a Fujairah oil facility on May [07:24] 4th and 5th. I made a video about that. [07:27] Rather than retaliating, the United [07:29] States suspended Project Freedom, [07:32] a military operation designed to counter [07:34] Iran's chokehold [07:36] over the Strait of Hormuz and pivoted [07:37] towards negotiations with Tehran. So, [07:39] understand what just happened here. [07:41] The States implements this Project [07:43] Freedom. They announce it. [07:45] Iran retaliates by attack by launching [07:48] missiles and drones at the UAE. That [07:51] happened a few days ago. You might [07:52] remember that. [07:54] If you don't, go back and watch my video [07:55] about it. [07:58] And the United States' reaction was not [08:02] to retaliate against Iran. [08:05] Rather, the United States suspended [08:06] Project Freedom and basically said, "Oh, [08:08] this This is a minor [08:11] This is a minor issue." Or they didn't [08:12] really respond to the [08:16] to the to the attacks on [08:19] on on the UAE. And you know, this was [08:22] expressed really well in a tweet. Here, [08:24] let me move this over here. [08:27] Check out this tweet from Iyad Allawi. [08:28] Iyad Allawi is [08:30] interesting guy. He was an undercover [08:32] agent in Al-Qaeda for many years. He's [08:34] He lives in in Abu Dhabi. [08:36] And he's a pretty well-respected analyst [08:38] of the Middle East. Look what he writes [08:40] here. "Having spoken to a senior Saudi [08:42] official about the NBC article regarding [08:44] Project Freedom, I honestly think [08:46] that the article, meaning the NBC [08:48] article, completely misunderstood what [08:49] actually happened because it was written [08:52] almost entirely from a US perspective [08:54] rather from than from a GCC expect [08:56] perspective. He says they were not [08:58] blindsided by Project Freedom. They knew [09:00] about it beforehand, roughly half a day [09:02] before. Their airspace was open, the [09:04] facilities were available, nobody [09:05] objected. There was broad support for it [09:08] because at least publicly Project [09:09] Freedom was supposed to be a limited [09:11] humanitarian security operation aimed at [09:13] relieving the 22,000 sailors trapped [09:16] around Hormuz cuz there's all these [09:17] ships that are stuck there and allowing [09:19] shipping lanes to breathe again. No one [09:22] in the GCC had a problem with that. But [09:24] here's the issue. [09:26] And this is the part that the NBC [09:27] article missed. If you're asking GCC [09:30] countries to participate in such an [09:31] operation, then you need to be upfront [09:33] about the rules of engagement from day [09:35] one. You can't say, "Please open your [09:37] skies and bases, expose your energy [09:39] infrastructure, only for everyone to [09:41] discover afterwards that the actual [09:43] American policy was apparently, oh by [09:45] the way, if Iran attacks you with [09:47] ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and [09:49] drones in several waves, we still won't [09:52] retaliate because Donald Trump is busy [09:55] chasing a deal. [09:58] And that's exactly what shocked the [09:59] Saudis, not the Iranian attack itself. [10:03] The UAE and the GCC expected [10:04] retaliation. This is Iran. Nobody in the [10:07] Gulf is naive about that. The shock came [10:11] from the American reaction afterwards. [10:15] Okay, that is [10:17] so that's his take on this and that's [10:19] what this article is basically saying. [10:21] That [10:22] the Gulf states looked at these attacks [10:25] on the UAE by Iran and that's what gave [10:28] them and they saw that the United States [10:29] did nothing to defend the UAE against [10:32] these attacks. [10:34] And that's what made them realize that [10:35] maybe the US is not so reliable. [10:39] For many Gulf leaders, the decision felt [10:41] like abandonment. Privately, several [10:43] leaders accused Washington of [10:45] sacrificing Gulf security to protect [10:47] Israel and avoid risks to American [10:50] forces, but the anger was not simply [10:52] about one military decision. It [10:54] reflected something much deeper, an [10:55] accumulated frustration with the [10:57] fundamental nature of the US-Gulf [10:59] relationship itself. [11:01] The informal US-Gulf-Israel security [11:04] architecture, US-Gulf-Israel, [11:06] cuz it's been informal. There's been a [11:08] lot of cooperation over the last few [11:10] years. This relationship functioned [11:12] somewhat smoothly for nearly four [11:14] decades with the GCC states hosting [11:17] major American bases and working closely [11:20] with Washington. [11:21] At the same time, they've been careful [11:22] to avoid the appearance of a formal [11:25] alliance in order to forestall any [11:27] domestic backlash. In other words, they [11:28] have large, of course, Muslim [11:31] populations and the Muslim [11:33] populace in these countries even if at [11:36] the at the leadership level they're [11:37] making agreements with the Americans and [11:39] the Israelis and they're working [11:40] together behind the scenes. If they [11:42] would make that formal, they could have [11:44] domestic backlash because their [11:46] populations do not want normalization [11:50] with Israel. [11:52] The ongoing Iran war has exposed the [11:54] fragility of this model as the Gulf [11:56] states, especially the UAE, are finding [11:57] themselves in the crosshairs of Iran's [12:01] retaliation. Washington they believe is [12:03] not stepping up to defend them [12:05] sufficiently. Gulf leaders are now [12:07] openly questioning whether such an [12:08] arrangement remains politically or [12:11] strategically viable. [12:13] Amazing. [12:15] That sense of vulnerability has steadily [12:17] turned to resentment. Gulf governments [12:19] increasingly believe they're expected to [12:21] carry disproportionate risks without [12:24] receiving corresponding guarantees or [12:27] meaningful consultation. Many officials [12:29] argue, with some justification, that [12:31] they are more invested in preserving the [12:33] alliance than Washington itself appears [12:35] to be. [12:37] Now, Gulf states are not blind to a [12:39] difficult reality. However, no other [12:40] power currently possesses the capacity [12:42] to replace the American security [12:44] umbrella, particularly in areas such as [12:46] missile defense, intelligence [12:47] coordination, naval protection, and [12:49] extended deterrence. Of course, there's [12:51] no one else who could who could do what [12:52] the United States is doing and and of [12:54] course the European nations have shown [12:55] themselves to be completely uninterested [12:57] in helping. So, the Gulf states [12:59] certainly are aware that the United [13:00] States is kind of the only game in town. [13:02] You have to have some dependence on [13:04] them. Yet, even as they acknowledge this [13:07] dependence, Gulf capitals are quietly [13:09] recalibrating their exposure and [13:12] preparing alternatives. [13:14] What does that mean? This means is that [13:16] they look at the situation they say, [13:17] "Look, the US is really the only big [13:19] powerful game in town, but they're not [13:21] reliable. [13:23] So, we still need them and we still need [13:25] to have a good relationship with them [13:26] and we need them to do whatever they can [13:28] do on our behalf, but we can't put all [13:30] our eggs in one basket. [13:32] Because look how unreliable they are. [13:35] You know, Israel's been dealing with the [13:36] same thing in some way. Like Israel has [13:38] this wonderful relationship with the [13:39] United States, but at the same time [13:40] there's the US, [13:42] you know, in bed with Erdogan in Turkey [13:45] and in how he deals with Syria and [13:46] propping up this Al-Julani guy [13:49] who's who's massacring uh [13:52] who's massacring minorities in Syria, [13:54] but also is is an ISIS Al-Qaeda alumnus [13:58] who's empowering jihadist groups [14:00] and [14:02] and the way they ha and the way the [14:04] United States handles its relationship [14:06] to Qatar who's [14:09] an arch enemy of Israel and spreads [14:10] anti-Israel [14:12] uh influence operations all over the [14:14] world and and is is the main backer of [14:17] of the Muslim Brotherhood and all of its [14:18] networks around the world that threaten [14:20] Israel. [14:22] So the and of course Donald Trump's not [14:24] the only person who's ever president. [14:26] And during the Biden administration [14:27] Israel started recalibrating and looking [14:29] for other other partners. [14:31] Started building up a better [14:32] relationship with Russia and with China [14:35] which I wasn't thrilled with, but you [14:37] know, you have to hedge. [14:38] So the Gulf states are seeing that the [14:40] United States might not be such a [14:41] reliable partner. [14:44] So the result is an back to the article [14:46] is an aggressive hedging strategy [14:48] playing out across the region. Gulf [14:50] governments are diversifying [14:52] their defense relationships. [14:54] Acquiring European radar systems, [14:57] partnering with Ukraine on anti-drone [14:58] technologies, [15:00] and channeling increasing investment [15:01] into European defense industries. [15:04] Financial diversification is [15:06] accelerating too with discussions [15:07] underway about reducing reliance on [15:10] dollar-based settlements. [15:12] So for example the other day and I [15:14] mentioned this in a previous video, we [15:15] saw that the UAE made a major [15:17] announcement that they ordered a fleet [15:20] of C-390s. [15:21] C-390s are a That is a Brazilian [15:25] aircraft. [15:27] Okay, they ordered They ordered these [15:29] from a Brazilian manufacturer, and they [15:31] made a point of announcing it. And [15:33] they're signaling and this is a This is [15:34] a major piece of equipment. I did a [15:35] video where I talked about why it's so [15:37] why it's such an important piece of [15:38] equipment strategically. [15:40] But what's happening here is they're [15:41] diversifying their dependence. [15:46] So that they don't have all their eggs [15:47] in the American basket. And what that [15:49] means in terms of reducing their [15:51] dependence on dollar-based settlements [15:53] is also huge. You think about what the [15:55] Chinese and the Russians want to do with [15:57] BRICS to take down the US dollar. If you [15:59] have Gulf states saying, "Hey, maybe the [16:01] US isn't so reliable and uh [16:03] we shouldn't view them as the only game [16:04] in town." That could be a threat to the [16:06] US dollar. [16:07] In the UAE, some policy makers have gone [16:09] further, openly questioning whether [16:11] hosting American mili- military bases [16:13] remains a strategic advantage. Or maybe [16:16] it's become or it has or has become a [16:18] dangerous liability. Gulf leaders insist [16:21] that any future security cooperation [16:23] with Washington must include genuine [16:26] consultation before military action [16:29] begins. Unified command structures and [16:32] binding treaty commitments, rather than [16:34] the informal understandings that have [16:36] characterized the relationship until [16:37] now. In other words, the United States [16:39] doesn't have formal alliance structures [16:42] with the Gulf states. It just has a kind [16:43] of informal relationship. [16:45] But because it's informal, the US can [16:47] kind of do whatever it wants. And they [16:49] feel like, "Hey, look, we have to suffer [16:51] the impact and the results of US [16:54] military decisions that it's making in [16:56] our area, but we're not part of We're [16:58] not in the room. We're not part of those [16:59] decisions. And then when we suffer those [17:02] consequences, like the UAE just did, the [17:04] United States isn't sta- isn't stepping [17:06] up to defend us." [17:08] Because Trump wants his deal, as I'm on [17:10] Dean pointed out. [17:12] China looks at this as an opportunity to [17:14] expand its preven- its presence and [17:16] influence across the globe. As [17:18] confidence in America declines, China is [17:21] steadily cultivating partnerships with [17:23] Saudi Arabia, Iran, the UAE, and Israel, [17:26] but without the encumbrances of a formal [17:28] alliance system. [17:29] Chinese technology firms are embedding [17:31] themselves deeply in Gulf infrastructure [17:34] through 5G networks, artificial [17:35] intelligence partnerships, digital [17:36] payment systems, creating long-term [17:39] technological dependencies that will [17:40] prove difficult to unwind. The Chinese [17:43] know how to manipulate, they know how to [17:44] take advantage of the situation, but [17:46] from the standpoint of the Gulf states [17:49] and Israel, [17:51] Israel's mentioned here as well, and I [17:52] mentioned that this is not this is not [17:53] about response to Trump. Israel's very [17:55] happy with the Trump administration, [17:57] although again, you have to hedge, you [17:58] have to be more independent. This also [18:00] plays into why Israel why Netanyahu, [18:03] Prime Minister Netanyahu, has announced [18:04] recently repeatedly [18:06] his desire to wind down USA to Israel, [18:09] not because of Trump, but because of [18:11] what what's happened. You see that the [18:13] US has all kinds of leverage in Israel's [18:15] decision-making. [18:16] You saw it during the Biden time after [18:19] October 7th, all the leverage that the [18:21] US has in Israel's decision-making. All [18:23] across the region, there are there are [18:25] states that are looking at the United [18:27] States and saying, "Okay, [18:29] you know, we need to diversify, we need [18:31] to hedge, we need to have other [18:33] alliances so that we don't have all our [18:35] eggs in the American basket because they [18:37] may not be so reliable." [18:42] I'm jumping ahead a little. I'll skip a [18:43] couple lines. Some analysts are also [18:45] pointing to the emergence of a new [18:47] informal regional grouping involving [18:50] Egypt, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and [18:52] Turkey. [18:53] That's not good. [18:54] Driven by worries about regional [18:56] instability, the economic consequences [18:58] of the ongoing war, and concerns about [19:00] Israel's aggressive military posture. [19:02] You see what you have here in Egypt, [19:04] Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey is [19:06] the new Sunni power structure being [19:09] built. These are all formidable [19:10] countries each in their own way. Egypt [19:12] is a collapsing failed state, but it's a [19:14] massive population. It's the largest [19:16] uh you know, population in the area. And [19:18] then you have Pakistan, which is a which [19:20] is a nuclear uh a country. You have [19:23] Saudi Arabia, you have Turkey. These are [19:25] all powerhouses, and they're and they're [19:28] they're starting to to band together as [19:31] a Sunni alliance. And notice the UAE is [19:34] not part of that. [19:36] One concrete outcome has already [19:37] materialized in the form of a landmark [19:39] Saudi-Pakistan defense pact designed to [19:42] strengthen deterrence and deepen [19:44] strategic cooperation between Riyadh and [19:46] the nuclear-armed South Asian power, [19:48] although a whole lot of good that did [19:50] Saudi Arabia when Iran attacked them. [19:52] Even as Gulf states search for new [19:54] alignments, divisions within the GCC [19:56] remain considerable. Publicly, the [19:58] organization continues to project unity, [20:01] insisting that an attack on one member [20:02] can constitutes an attack on all. But in [20:04] practice, member states pursue sharply [20:08] different strategies. The UAE has moved [20:10] closer to Israel on security matters, [20:13] reportedly received an Iron Dome air [20:14] defense system during the conflict. Oman [20:17] and Qatar, [20:19] by contrast, on the other hand, they [20:21] continue to prioritize diplomacy and [20:23] mediation with Tehran. [20:25] So, they're not all on the same page. [20:28] And then and then it talks about how [20:29] Iran is exploiting this [20:31] uh and and trying to emphasize the fact [20:34] that the US is not a reliable partner. [20:38] And finally, it ends, "The consequences [20:39] are unmistakable. The old regional [20:41] order, built around unquestioned [20:43] American primacy, is eroding. [20:47] Gulf states are no longer willing to [20:49] rely exclusively on Washington without [20:52] demanding structural changes to the [20:54] partnership." [20:56] But then you have this uh [20:58] this story today that the US weighs [21:01] reviving the Hormuz Project Freedom [21:04] as Saudi Arabia, Ku- Kuwait [21:08] as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait reopen [21:09] military access. [21:11] The move removes a significant obstacle [21:13] for Trump's effort to secure commercial [21:15] shipping routes through the Strait of [21:17] Hormuz, according to the Wall Street [21:18] Journal. [21:19] Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have lifted [21:20] restrictions. This was just today. [21:22] They've lifted restrictions on the US [21:24] military's use of air of their bases and [21:26] airspace that were imposed after the [21:28] launch of American of the American [21:29] operation aimed at reopening the Straits [21:31] of Hormuz. [21:33] The Wall Street Journal reported that [21:34] the Trump administration is preparing to [21:36] restart the escort operations. [21:39] It had been paused after operating for [21:41] only 36 hours. Pentagon planners are now [21:43] assessing timelines for resuming the [21:45] operation. [21:47] And it just talks about how this removes [21:50] an an obstacle and now they can do it. [21:51] It doesn't say why they reversed course, [21:55] but obviously there was some kind of [21:57] concession that was extracted. We have [21:59] We haven't seen full reporting on why it [22:00] is. [22:02] But [22:03] what I what I wanted you to [22:05] to really get out of this video, what I [22:07] want to really emphasize here is [22:11] why this Project Freedom was halted. [22:14] It's not because they were blindsided. [22:17] If they if they liked it, if they're in [22:19] favor of it, if it's good for them, even [22:21] if they were blindsided, they would have [22:22] kept quiet about that. And as I'm on [22:24] Dean pointed out, they weren't [22:25] blindsided. The United States they're [22:27] not [22:28] The Americans aren't bumbling idiots. [22:30] Of course they're going to tell the [22:31] Saudis in advance that they're doing [22:32] this. Of course they're going to tell [22:34] the Kuwaitis. They need their airspace. [22:35] They need their They need what they're [22:37] doing. They're not They weren't [22:37] blindsided by the decision [22:40] to do this operation. [22:42] What they were blindsided by [22:44] was [22:45] the [22:46] lack of American response [22:50] when the UAE was attacked [22:54] once this began. [22:57] Once the Project Freedom began. [22:59] And that was just one more example as [23:03] far as they're concerned [23:04] of the United States seeming to be more [23:06] interested in cutting a deal with the [23:08] Iranians than protecting them. [23:11] Now, I think there's something else at [23:12] work here. [23:14] Besides everything I've said, and this [23:15] is this might even sound like it's going [23:17] against my my previous analysis, but in [23:19] the world of geopolitical calculations, [23:22] there can be multiple motives [23:24] for decisions. That's very important to [23:26] remember. If people say like like like [23:28] right now, I'm going to give you another [23:30] reason that I believe another reason for [23:33] the Saudis [23:34] slamming on the brakes and saying [23:36] they're not so sure about this Project [23:37] Freedom thing. [23:38] Okay? [23:40] And it's different. That doesn't mean [23:42] that the two reasons are mutually [23:43] exclusive and it's either or. I'm not [23:45] contradicting myself. Very important. [23:47] I'm belaboring this point because when [23:50] we think about geopolitics and we offer [23:52] different reasons for things, if the [23:54] reasons can coexist, it could be that a [23:56] state views multiple motives [23:59] It has multiple motives for a decision [24:01] and they're all there. [24:03] Okay, before I before I go on, just [24:05] please make sure that you're subscribed [24:06] to this channel, that you share it with [24:08] other people. Make sure that you go into [24:10] the description of this video, look for [24:12] the link to to uh sign up for the [24:14] newsletter at Israel 365 Action and [24:17] Israel 365 News. [24:20] Make sure you look for that. We have a a [24:21] great webinar coming up on the 20th, uh [24:23] a week uh [24:26] on uh which is um which is a week from [24:29] a week from when? No, I'm sorry. It's [24:31] it's it's about 2 weeks from now, 2 [24:32] weeks from yesterday. [24:34] Uh we have a great webinar coming up. [24:36] We're we're all about the whole question [24:37] of the America First movement and [24:39] Israel. It's going to be great. So So, [24:41] look for that. I'll be talking about it [24:43] more in the coming days as we get closer [24:44] to the event so that I give you all the [24:46] sign-up information. It's going to be a [24:47] great webinar with great speakers. [24:49] Uh we're going to have uh yeah, I'll [24:51] announce them in the next few days. [24:53] But please make sure you're subscribed [24:55] to this channel and to the Israel 365 [24:56] news YouTube channel as well. [24:59] Okay. So, [25:01] here is what I believe is, let's say, an [25:03] additional reason that the Saudis [25:07] and the Kuwaitis were not so sure about [25:10] this project freedom thing. [25:12] I mean, it all it all comes back to this [25:14] issue of not trusting American security [25:16] guarantees. [25:19] Which is [25:22] these guys are not so sure about the [25:25] Iranian regime falling. [25:27] The moves that the US is making to try [25:29] to cut a deal [25:31] with the remaining mobsters at the top [25:34] of the Iranian regime [25:36] worry everyone in the region. [25:38] They worry everybody in the region. [25:42] And if opening up the Strait of Hormuz [25:44] and taking away this chip from the [25:45] Iranians [25:47] will lead to [25:49] the potential collapse of the Iranian [25:51] regime, [25:53] if that's what it'll lead to, [25:55] that also worries them. [25:57] You see, they kind of see this as this [25:59] situation as a bit of a lose-lose. [26:02] The Saudis, [26:04] and I've been saying this since before [26:05] the war started, [26:06] I'm not so sure that the Saudis even [26:08] want the Iranian regime to be toppled. [26:11] They certainly are fine with it being [26:13] very weak. [26:15] But, if the Iranian regime is replaced, [26:19] if it completely collapses, [26:21] the various possibilities of what [26:23] emerges. A, massive chaos and violence, [26:26] which leads to a refugee crisis in the [26:28] area, [26:29] or just all kinds of security issues on [26:32] their border. They don't want that. [26:35] They also don't want it being a peaceful [26:37] transition of power to a pro-Western, [26:40] openly democratic, free society in Iran. [26:43] Like, you know, the the Iran that we're [26:44] all dreaming about and that people on on [26:46] online are saying, "Well, it'll be [26:47] great, you know, bring back Reza Pahlavi [26:49] and free the Iranian people. And the [26:51] Iranian people are really very [26:53] pro-Western and that's all wonderful and [26:54] I believed all that, too. [26:56] The problem is that [26:58] if if we get what we want and Iran [27:01] becomes a pro-Western democratic nation [27:03] where where all religions can practice [27:05] freely and you know, Christianity starts [27:07] flourishing, [27:09] that's the last thing the Saudis want on [27:10] their border. [27:11] And they certainly don't want to lose [27:13] their strategic importance. Saudis are [27:16] the are such a strategically important [27:19] country in part because the Iranian [27:21] regime exists because there's this rogue [27:24] regime in Tehran. If you look at the [27:26] Middle East map, the two largest [27:28] landmasses by far are the are Saudi [27:30] Arabia and Iran. [27:32] And if [27:33] and they're both massive oil-producing [27:35] nations. [27:36] If Iran becomes a pro-Western [27:39] democracy, Saudi Arabia's strategic [27:41] leverage [27:42] is much reduced. So, there's a variety [27:45] of motives going on here. The Saudis are [27:47] worried about the Iranian regime being [27:48] brought down. They don't trust American [27:51] security guarantees. [27:53] Um [27:54] and they and they and they know that the [27:56] Iranians are going to lash out at [27:57] everyone in the region more and more as [27:59] they're collapsing if they do collapse. [28:02] The attacks on the UAE, they saw as only [28:04] the beginning of that. [28:06] So, there's a variety of motives going [28:08] on simultaneously that led the Saudis [28:10] and the Kuwaitis like, you know, these [28:12] guys to say, "We're not so sure about [28:13] this. [28:14] We're not so sure that this is the right [28:16] course of action." So, they slammed on [28:17] the brakes and they prevented it. Now, [28:20] again, a few hours ago it was announced [28:21] in the Wall Street Journal that they're [28:23] now going to ramp it up again and [28:24] they've now given permission and we'll [28:26] see what that means. We have to wait for [28:27] some more uh some more statements to be [28:29] made. Let's see what the Americans [28:31] actually say when they step up to the [28:32] mics [28:33] uh later on today, maybe tomorrow. We'll [28:36] we'll see some statements uh out of uh [28:38] out of the White House, out of the State [28:39] Department, out of the Defense [28:40] Department and see what it all really [28:42] means. [28:43] But, [28:44] I I wanted to use this situation as a [28:46] way of of you know, pulling off the lid [28:48] and and showing you some of the internal [28:51] dynamics going on in the Middle East and [28:53] how it's not all rosy in terms of how [28:55] every how everyone even the enemies of [28:58] Iran are viewing American actions. And [29:00] the UAE is the most interesting player [29:02] here as much as they're very closely [29:04] aligned strategically with American [29:06] interests and Israeli interests, they [29:07] also don't fully trust the Americans to [29:09] be reliable long-term [29:12] and are looking to become more [29:13] independent and and and more [29:16] reliant on a variety of different [29:19] of different partnerships [29:21] so that they don't have too many eggs in [29:23] the American basket. [29:25] So, yeah, that's what I wanted to share. [29:27] I think I think it's you know, we'll [29:29] continue watching the situation. I'll [29:31] continue bringing my bringing you my [29:33] analysis [29:34] as it as it unfolds. Thank you for [29:37] watching. Thanks for help growing the [29:38] channel [29:39] and [29:40] God bless.
